Footnote 201, Chapter 9, Page 330:

The following information was originally provided in the section concerning dissidents on page 330. Like others who presumably have decided that the likely benefits of continued anti-system violence are worth the risk to their wellbeing incurred by such violence, those who perpetrate such violence and who live in the Republic of Ireland do not have to fear that it will dramatically decrease their communities’ living conditions. Unfortunately, there is no geographical data available for about one-quarter of the dissidents for which the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Pennsylvania State University has gathered data. However, of those dissidents for which geographical data was found, 54.5 per cent “hail from the Republic,” while only 39 per cent are from Northern Ireland. Horgan and Paul Gill report that “[n]early three-quarters” of those members of Republican Sinn Féin for whom they have data are from the Republic. Republican Sinn Féin is the political organization linked to one of the main violent dissident groups, the Continuity IRA. Horgan explains that his project’s data indicates that a greater percentage of dissidents is now from Northern Ireland but also points out that “the largest proportion of convicted [dissident] personnel thus far actually resided in the Republic.” Of the 141 dissident “political and community activists” for which he found data, 106 were based in the Republic. Horgan observes that his data indicating dissidents’ geographic homes and events data “indicate a strong likelihood that planning and training for actual [dissident] attacks have largely originated there.” It is a striking but unsurprising aspect of dissident activity in this region that substantial amounts of it seem to originate outside its borders. Consideration of Northern Ireland’s relationship with the Republic and Britain, in conjunction with recognition of the groups most likely to be represented among the dissidents, emphasizes the influence that can be exerted by those outside a consociationally governed entity both before and during its operation. Perhaps the likely outcomes of gridlock and excessive anti-system violence are substantially less frightening to those perpetrating and organizing dissident violence in Northern Ireland than they would in South Africa. Ironically, some nationalist dissident leaders attempt to build popular support by claiming to follow in the footsteps of the anti-treaty group in the Irish Civil War, who continued violently opposing British governance of Ireland. The Irish party system remains organized around the division corresponding to that civil war and this antagonism makes an occasional political appearance there. However, it is interesting that this war, in which neither side attracted external military intervention, yielded a huge number of casualties but the country’s governance system has since “prove[n] remarkably stable.” Considering current nationalist dissident activity and rhetoric with South Africa’s comparative lack of anti-system intergroup antagonism and stable governance in the republic following the Irish Civil War, emphasizes that some phenomena other than Northern Ireland’s governance system may be contributing to destabilizing initiatives there. In the latter two situations, power sharing between the antagonistic groups was not mandated and those who failed to achieve power did not attempt to destabilize their states following their losses. Nationalist dissidents in Northern Ireland seem to be inadequately deterred from violent pursuit of their goals even though their community has equal political power and the necessary tool for achieving its pursuit of incorporation into the Republic of Ireland. Perhaps this may be partially due to greater experience of intervention by actors external to the region. Northern Ireland’s experience constitutes some of the best evidence in existence illustrating the potential effectiveness of consociation as a means of promoting stability even in societies whose cleavages had been deemed inimical to peace by many observers. The performance of this system there suggests that it is advisable to view such societies more optimistically than Rabushka and Shepsle, who concluded that “[h]istory shows that democratic stability and cultural diversity are often incompatible in the postindependence politics of many plural societies.” The anti-system violence which continues in Northern Ireland is extremely limited compared to the extent of such violence before 1998, which makes sense because the region’s consociational system allocates political power more fairly to its historically antagonistic communities than any alternative system could. While developments in Northern Ireland provide very strong evidence for the advisability of consociation, analysis of this limited anti-system violence does suggest some factors involving the application of this system can render societies more vulnerable to anti-system violence. It seems that current anti-system dissidents, as well as their active and passive supporters, feel that they have more to gain and not much to lose by pursuing anti-system violence. Several of the conditions identified by Lijphart as favoring consociation seem to be influencing this calculation and their ability to attract support. This situation also suggests that one potential means of deterring such dissent, in systems offering equal political opportunities, may be initiatives designed to increase the negative consequences of destabilization for the violent dissidents.